Major Nuclear Accidents and their causes

Nuclear power will be an important issue going forward, especially when other forms of energy begin to become more expensive, or their environmental impact becomes too great. When it comes to safety though, a great number of people only read the headlines about nuclear accidents, making assumptions about their causes. It is important to examine the major incidents involving nuclear power, and the causes behind them, so that we can better judge whether the safety and procedures exist to qualify nuclear power as safe or not.

Let's first look at what are likely the best known incidents involving nuclear power. Because of how recently it happened, the most prominent incident in many young people's eyes is the meltdown event that occurred at the Fukushima Daiichi power plant in Japan during March of 2011. The second event that the world is well acquainted with is the meltdown that occurred at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant in the Ukraine in 1986. So what caused these events to happen? Was it a failure of the technology, or was human error to blame? The distinction is important, because if the technology itself is inherently dangerous, then it may not be a viable alternative for future energy production. If, on the other hand, human error was to blame, then maybe we simply need to learn lessons from these events to teach us how to be safer in the future. Below is reactor number four at Chernobyl, shortly after a nuclear meltdown and explosion caused the biggest release of nuclear contamination in human history:

Below is the Fukushima Daiichi power plant in late March of 2011, after meltdowns and hydrogen explosions damaged its reactor buildings.

Lars Hogberg, of the Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences, addressed these issues in his February 2013 article entitled "Root Causes and Impacts of Severe Accidents at Large Nuclear Power Plants." Hogberg concludes that among the root causes of Chernobyl were "Serious deficiencies in design", and, more importantly, numerous deficiencies in safety protocols, procedures, and actions on the part of plant operators, and their superiors. Hogberg notes that "these deficiencies showed that there was a general lack of safety culture in the political and organizational system, at the national level as well as locally." When discussing the incident in Japan, Hogberg finds that the Japanese regulatory authorities, and the owners of the power plant, were negligent in upgrading the plant to withstand the possibility of a tsunami of the size it encountered after the earthquake that put the meltdown events into motion. This lack of infrastructure upgrades directly resulted in the series of events at the plant ending with the meltdowns of several reactors. 

Similarly, a report on the World Nuclear Association's website summarized the post-incident reports of several regulatory agencies regarding the accident at Fukushima in 2011. They characterized the cause of the incident as the lack of appropriate infrastructure and facility design to withstand the tsunami. Their report on the Chernobyl incident also characterizes the main causes of the event as procedural failures among the plant operating staff, and several system design deficiencies. 

On one hand, both sources seem to characterize the causes of these accidents similarly. With regard to Chernobyl, both articles mention design deficiencies and procedural failures. Both articles regarding Fukushima also largely agree that design deficiencies are the cause of that incident. Perhaps where these sources differ slightly is in where they place the ultimate blame for the design deficiencies and procedures. It's sometimes hard to place blame on one level of organization. Is it the scientists that designed these systems in the first place, or a failure in the safety procedures and protocols in operating the equipment? In the case of Fukushima, blame could be placed mostly on the power company that operated the plant (TEPCO), for their lack of infrastructure updates to ensure safety from tsunamis.

In the end, it seems to me like there are both failures in the (old, outdated) technology, and failures in the procedures that are designed to enhance safety. I would have to say the lion's share of the blame should go towards plant operators, and those people that are responsible for putting into place the appropriate equipment and procedures to safely utilize the technology. It doesnt seem to me that the technology is inherently unsafe, but failures can clearly happen when the technology is old and outdated. Clearly the consequences are dire when anything fails though. These two sources have instilled in me the grave importance of proper procedures, operating protocols, and the need for companies to keep their sites up to date as far as safety features are concerned. So what needs to be done going forward from a procedural standpoint to ensure safety? Are there new forms of technology in nuclear power that are even safer than today's methods? In my next post, I will discuss the future of nuclear power, and what is on the horizon in terms of safety. Will it be enough to ensure nuclear power's survival?